First, consider an Epicurean view of death: death cannot hurt us because it cannot make us feel bad. Lucretius lays the groundwork for this argument in his book, On The Nature Of Things,

Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that elapsed before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in which nature shows us the time to come after our death. Do you see anything fearful in it?(1)

The symmetry argument fleshed out:

(i) Death is nonexistence (ii) There was a long period of non-existence before I was born(PBE). (iii) There was no sense in which that nonexistence was bad for me. (iv) The long period of non-existence after death(NE) is just the same. (v) So, the period of nonexistence after your death is not bad either.(2)

Significant work has been done to reveal issues in the symmetry argument(see deprivation). Notably, these contradictions show, in a pleasure-pain conception, the analogy between PBE and NE is not sufficient. Possible pleasure in NE has more value than possible pleasure in PBE; the former is preferred to the latter. Death, the beginning of NE, deprives us of future pleasure, whereas PBE only deprives us of past positives. NE deprives us of that which is preferred, PBE does not. Therefore the analogy between PBE and NE is not acceptable

There is also another way to reject the soundness of the symmetry argument. Let’s imagine a four-dimensional manifold that contends that past, present, and future all rest on equal footing(eternalism). Premise one of the symmetry argument posits that death is non-existence, but considering eternalism, this is not sound. Once death occurs all future possibilities become non-existent, yet the past still exists. Therefore, death is not non-existence.

Despite the ‘realness’ of these periods, how should things like pre and post ‘existence be judged? And do they even exist?

Within the four-dimensional block of time, we can agree that one’s lifetime exists. I like to think of this as a discrete line inside the block. If this is taken seriously, then the period before your line within the block is realized(PBE) is distinct from the long period of non-existence after your death(NE). In PBE, your realized line is yet lived(but will be) - however, in its realization, there will be a future, which becomes present, then past, and so on until NE. After death or the start of NE, your line within the block was already realized, so there is no implication of line continuation - the movement of the future into and the present into the past will no longer be; only the past can now exist. Therefore, PBE and NE are in tension with each other, not analogous as Lucretius wants us to believe.

Adopting this view does something interesting to the deprivation argument as well. Essentially, death would not be bad for us because there is no future possibility of pleasure; no pleasure in NE. Considering this, there is no ‘badness’ of NE.

I wonder what everyone thinks about this. What would Lucretius say? How about those contending the deprivation argument? Considering I also have many unanswered questions and flaws in my formulation as it stands, more perspective would be great!

A few things that still need to be worked out:

If, as in my example, NE marks a point that implies no future possibility, but also a point where the past does exist, there is an implication of the future. Therefore work needs to be done here. The line within the eternal block. Is it possible to view a line inside the block and then mark the period before and after the line is realized as PBE and NE or not? Grounding eternalism in the badness of death. Against Lucretius’ second premise.

Sources: 1 LUCRETIUS. Book 3, p.138, 955-980, On The Nature Of Things. Translated by Martin Ferguson Smith. Cambridge: Hackett, 2001

2 Based on lecture by Dr. Freya Mobus at Loyola, University of Chicago(PHIL 310: HUMAN NATURE)